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REINVENTING THE EXAMINATION
PROCESS FOR PATENT
APPLICATIONS COVERING
SOFTWARE-RELATED
INVENTIONS
By ALAN P.

I.

KLEINt

INTRODUCTION

Not all inventions can be patented. Although an invention is useful,
the United States Patent Office (hereinafter, the "Patent Office") may
reject a patent application on it, citing 35 U.S.C. section 101 of the Pat1
ent Act, if the claims are directed to non-statutory subject matter, or
citing 35 U.S.C. sections 102 and 103, if the claims are not new and non2
obvious over the prior art.
In the past, the Patent Office has refused patents on processes and
machines employing computer programs. Claims to these inventions
often recite a mathematical algorithm. Either the claim as a whole is for
the mathematical algorithm, or the claim contains a mathematical algorithm as one of its components. The Patent Office has rejected such
claims under section 101 on the 3ground that mathematical algorithms
are not statutory subject matter.
When these claims are rejected under section 101, the question of
their novelty and non-obviousness does not have to be addressed. Application of sections 102 and 103 requires that a determination be made as
* Copyright 1989, 1994 by Alan P. Klein. All rights reserved. Associate Counsel for
Intellectual Property (Patent Counsel, Headquarters), Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command, Arlington, Va., Ph.D., Solid State Physics, 1966, University of Pennsylvania;
J.D., 1973, Temple University. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author alone
and not those of the Administration, DOD or DON.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
2. Id. at §§ 102, 103.
3. Id. at § 101.
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to whether the mathematical algorithm is within the prior art. 4 Such a
determination is very difficult to make. A tremendous amount of prior
art must be searched. If the claims are rejected under section 101, it is
not necessary to determine whether the mathematical algorithm is
within the prior art. For many years this was a factor in the Patent
Office's blanket use of section 101 to dispose of such claims.
Currently, the Patent Office is using a three-step test to decide
whether to issue a patent on a computer program-related invention
which is useful. The first step is to determine whether the claim recites
a mathematical algorithm. If the answer to the threshold question is
"yes," proceed to the second step. In the second step, the Patent Office
asks whether the claim as a whole merely recites a mathematical algorithm. If the answer is "yes," the claim is not patentable under section
101. If the answer is "no," proceed to the third step. In the third step,
the Office determines whether the mathematical algorithm is within the
prior art, and asks whether the claim is new and non-obvious over the
prior art. If the answer is "no," the claim is not patentable under sections 102 and 103.
On January 26-27, 1994, in San Jose, California, and on February
10-11, 1994, in Arlington, Virginia, the Patent Office held public hearings on the use of the patent system to protect computer program-related
inventions. It was noted that different sectors of the software industry
have expressed concern over the ability of the Patent Office to examine
patent applications for computer program-related inventions effectively.
Critics of the Patent Office test say that it does not have the resources to apply the third step correctly. They argue that the Patent
Office often answers the third question "yes" because it is unable to determine that the mathematical algorithm is actually within the prior art.
They say the result is that computer program-related inventions which
are not new and non-obvious over the prior art are being patented and
withdrawn from the stock of knowledge freely available to all.
In the Notice Of Hearings And Request For Public Comments, the
following factors contributing to the problem were identified:
early programming techniques were not well documented... locating
and obtaining the most relevant prior art is extremely difficult, due to
the widely diverse nature of processes that have been implemented by
computer software-related systems; and software is not documented in
a consistent, readily understandable format (e.g., some programs only
provide object code, different programming languages
are used, source
5
code is not summarized or documented, etc.).
4. Id. at §§ 102, 103.
5. 58 Fed. Reg. 66, 347 (1993).
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This article addresses the issue of whether the Patent Office test
should be replaced by a better test. The article begins with a discussion
of the question of whether the bar of section 102(c) of the Patent Act
defines "prior art" under section 103, the non-obviousness provision. The
old combination doctrine is then analyzed and shown to be based on the
bar of section 102(c), coupled with section 103. Next, the old combination
doctrine is discussed in connection with the trilogy of cases decided by
the Supreme Court on the patentability of computer-related inventions
where it is argued that the old combination doctrine was applied. Lastly,
it is concluded that the Patent Office test is inconsistent with the standard employed by the Supreme Court, a standard which the Patent Office is bound to follow. This paper proposes a new and better test for
patenting computer-related software.
The first step of the new test is to ascertain whether the claim as a
whole is for a mathematical algorithm, or contains a mathematical algorithm as one of its components. If the answer to the threshold question is "yes" and the claim as a whole is for a mathematical algorithm,
the claim is not patentable under section 101. If the answer to the
threshold question is "yes" and the claim contains a mathematical algorithm as one of its components, proceed to the second step. In the second step, assume the algorithm is within the prior art (even if it is not),
and ask whether the claim is new and non-obvious over the prior art. If
the answer is "no," the claim is not patentable under sections 102 and
103.
Since this test assumes that the algorithm is within the prior art,
adopting it would simplify patentability determinations for the Patent
Office and silence its critics. It would no longer be necessary to determine whether the mathematical algorithm is actually within the prior
art.
II. ABANDONMENT AS PRIOR ART
35 U.S.C. section 103 of the Patent Act provides in part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains ..... 6
Section 103 refers to the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the "prior art."7 However, the expression
6. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).

7. Id.
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"prior art" does not appear at all in section 102.8 Thus, which bars of
section 102 may be used as "prior art" under section 103 is an open
question.
35 U.S.C. section 102(c) provides, "[a] person shall be entitled to a
patent unless.. .(c) he has abandoned the invention."9 Both Judge Rich
and Judge Baldwin of the Federal Circuit's predecessor court, the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA"), agreed that the bar of section
102(c) does not define "prior art" under section 103.10 Yet, while "[i]t is
admittedly difficult to conceive of abandoning an invention before it is
made in the 'anticipation' sense,"'1 several commentators have noted
that it does not follow that abandonment cannot be constructive or statutory prior art under section 103, particularly against later obvious varia12
tions of the abandoned invention.
Walterscheid, in his article, "The Ever Evolving Meaning of Prior
Art," makes two objections to the use of the bar of section 102(c) as "prior
art" under section 103.13 First, the public does not gain knowledge of the
invention; second, there is a problem in ascertaining when an invention
14
has been "truly abandoned."
However, there is one category of abandonment that is not subject to
these objections. An applicant for a patent is required by 35 U.S.C. section 112 to conclude the specification "with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention." 15 When the applicant has made his
or her claims, any subject matter disclosed (to the public), but not
claimed, is presumed to be abandoned and dedicated to the public. 16
The CCPA has stated that the presumption of abandonment is conclusive unless it is rebutted by one of three things: (1) filing a reissue
application pursuant to the last paragraph of 35 U.S.C. section 251
which permits a broadening reissue application to be filed up to two
years after the patent issues; (2) claiming the invention in a copending
application before the patent issues; or (3) filing an application claiming
the invention within the one year grace period following the issuance of
8. Id. at § 102.
9. Id. at § 102(c).
10. In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1290, 1295 n. 3, 177 U.S.P.Q. 178, 189, 193 n. 3
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (Baldwin, J., with whom Almond, J. joins).
11. Alton D. Rollins, Loss ofRight As 'PriorArt," 63 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y
663, 667 (1981).
12. Donald S. Chisum, Sources of PriorArt in Patent Law, 52 WASH. L. REV. 1, 10
(1976-77).
13. Edward C. Walterscheid, The Ever Evolving Meaning of PriorArt (Part 6), 65 J.
PAT. [M TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'y 658, 676-77 (1983).

14. Id.
15. The Corn-Planter Patent, 90 U.S. 181, 224 (1874).

16. Id.
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the patent before
the patent becomes a statutory bar under 35 U.S.C.
17
section 102(b).
III.

THE OLD COMBINATION DOCTRINE

8
The leading Supreme Court case on the "old combination" doctrine'
of patent law is Lincoln Engineering Co. of Illinois v. Stewart-Warner
Corp.19 In that case, the patentee invented an improved gripping chuck
for a grease gun, but instead of claiming it by itself, he claimed the entire
grease gun in which the elements performed no new function. 20 Citing
numerous precedents in a footnote, the Supreme Court stated that "the
improvement of one part of an old combination gives no right to claim
that improvement in combination with other old parts which perform no
21
new function in the combination."
The viability of a rejection based on this doctrine is in doubt because
it does not have a clear statutory basis under the Patent Act of 1952. In
In re Bernhart,22 the CCPA rejected it. 2 3 Acknowledging that the rejection "has the support of many cases," including Lincoln Engineering,the
CCPA held that the rule as stated is no longer "proper under the present
24
statute."
The CCPA concluded that the only statutory basis for an "old combination" rejection is the requirement in 35 U.S.C. section 112 that the
applicant include claims "particularly pointing out and distinctly claim25
ing the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention."
Since there is nothing peculiar about old combination claims that would
make them as a class nonparticular or indistinct, this was tantamount to
reading the "old combination" rejection out of existence.
However, the CCPA did not have the benefit of the Patent Office
Board Appeal's ruling in Ex parte Andresen.26 In that case, the Board

17. In re Gibbs, 437 F.2d 486, 494, 168 U.S.P.Q. 578, 584-85 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
18. See generally, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING, 197-204 (3d ed.
1990); U.S.P.T.O., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03 (j) (5th ed. rev.
1994); Robert A. Kreiss, The Theory of Overclaiming and Its Application to Diamond v.
Diehr, 66 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF.Soc'Y 52, 59 (1984); Thomas L. Grisman and Robert
P. Taylor, Vending an Old Combination:A Patent Misuse-AntitrustProblem, 51 J. PAT. [&
TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'Y 649 (1969).
19. 303 U.S. 545 (1938).

20. Id. at 548.
21. Id. at 549.
22. 417 F.2d 1395, 1403, 163 U.S.P.Q. 611, 618 (C.C.P.A. 1969). Accord, Radio Steel &
Mfg. Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 731 F.2d 840, 221 U.S.P.Q. 657 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
23. Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1403, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 618.
24. Id. at 1402.
25. Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. 731 F.2d at 845, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 661.
26. 212 U.S.P.Q. 100 (P.T.O.B.A. 1981).
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declared that the non-obviousness provision of 35 U.S.C. section 103 includes all of the various bars to a patent as set forth in 35 U.S.C. section
102.27 Recognizing that some of the bars may not be universally applicable to every applicant, but may apply only to certain applicants for a
patent, the Board stated, "[flor instance, the bar of section 102(c) may be
applicable only to the applicant who has previously abandoned his invention and thereafter attempts to patent the same invention or an obvious
modification of the abandoned invention." 28 It appears that there is a
clear statutory basis for the old combination rejection. It is the bar of 35
U.S.C. section 102(c) coupled with 35 U.S.C. section 103 (hereinafter,
"the sections 102(c)/103 bar").
In Lincoln Engineering, the plaintiff sued on a patent covering the
combination of a newly-invented gripping chuck with the other parts of a
grease gun.29 It was old to combine a gripping chuck with the other
parts of a grease gun. The omission to claim the gripping chuck by itself
30
was an abandonment (so that it was "within the prior art" and "old"),
and it was obvious to combine it with the other old parts of a grease gun
where the actions of these parts were not affected by the improvement of
the gripping chuck. The opinion stated that, "[t]he mere aggregation of a
number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, perform or
produce no new or different function or operation than that theretofore
31
performed or produced by them, is not patentable invention."
Notably, Lincoln Engineering is a 1938 case. The term "obvious"
and the requirement that non-obviousness is necessary for patentability
were new with the enactment of section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952.
Previously, however, the courts held patents invalid for lack of "invention" and the Patent Office had refused to issue patents for lack of
32
"invention."
Since the presumption of abandonment was not rebutted by the facts
in Lincoln Engineering, the patent's claim could properly have been invalidated under the sections 102(c)/103 bar. This interpretation is supported by the two Supreme Court cases which were cited at the
27. Id. at 102.
28. Id.
29. 303 U.S. 545 (1938).
30. Compare Wells v. Curtis, 66 F. 318, 321 (6th Cir. 1895) ("[iut is material to observe

that the invention claimed is not of the specific device in providing the casing as a bearing
for the ring, but is of a combination of certain described elements, of which that is one.
This amounts to a disclaimer of anything new in that element, so far as this patent is
concerned, whatever might be its value as the ground of an independent patent application.
That feature must therefore be treated as old.")
31. 303 U.S. 545, 549 (1938). This author previously proposed the sections 102(c)/103
bar as the statutory basis for the old combination doctrine. 73 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF.
Soc'y 557 (1991).
32. See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 225-26 (1976).
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beginning of the lengthy footnote of precedents following the holding in
33
Lincoln Engineering.
In Heald v. Rice, 34 the plaintiff sued on a reissue patent covering the
combination of a newly invented boiler with a straw-feeding attachment. 3 5 It was old to combine a boiler with a straw-feeding attachment.
The Court stated, "[i]n this case, Morey's patents were for combining
strawfeeders with portable steam-boilers generally. Rice discovered that
by substituting one particular kind of portable steam-boiler which no one
else had used for the steam boilers which had been used, that he had a
36
better combination."
The Supreme Court held that the omission to claim the boiler by
itself in the reissue patent (it had been claimed in the original patent)
was an abandonment of it. The Court stated:
It appears then, from the mere reading of the two specifications, that
the invention described in the first is for the return-flue boiler; while
that described in the second, abandoning the claim for the boiler itself,
is for a particular mode of using it, with straw as 3a7fuel, by means of an
attachment to the furnace-door for that purpose.
The plaintiff, in-fact, admitted in testimony that the boiler was old:
It further appears from the testimony of Rice that he considered the
main principle of his invention to be combining the arrangement, patented by Morey, with the return-flue boiler. He supposed at first that
his invention covered the boiler itself, though he found afterwards that
it was not new, but was on the contrary well known as the Cornish
38
boiler.
There was no invention in bringing the boiler together with the strawfeeding attachment:
What invention could he claim? He uses Morey's device precisely as
Morey's patent contemplated, and the Cornish boiler exactly as it was
designed it should be used. And in the combination each operates sepaThere was no inventive resource
rately, producing its own results. 39
drawn upon to bring them together.
Similarly, in Underwood v. Gerber,'40 the plaintiff sued on a patent
covering the combination of a newly-invented coating for making carbon
paper (such as used in typewriters) with paper. 4 1 It was old to combine
such a coating with paper. The Supreme Court stated, "[tihe opinion of
33. 303 U.S. at 550 n. 6.
34. 104 U.S. 737 (1881).

35. Id.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 747.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 746.
104 U.S. 737, 755 (1881).
149 U.S. 224 (1892).
Id. at 225.
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the Circuit Court says that in view of the earlier patents and publications put in evidence, it was difficult to see what novelty or invention
there was in taking a coloring substance already known and applying it
to paper;.., that such a combination was old." 42 The Court held that the
omission to claim the coating by itself was an abandonment of it, and
that there was no invention in applying the coating to paper. 43 The
Court stated, "[a]s No. 348,073 [the patent sued on] does not claim the
composition of matter, although it describes it, that composition must be
regarded as disclaimed, and as being public property, and there was no
44
invention in applying it to paper, as claimed in the patent sued on."
In addition, this interpretation is supported by In re McNeil, 45 a
case from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, the predecessor court to the CCPA. McNeil was also cited in the lengthy footnote of
precedents following the holding in Lincoln Engineering, and it is the
leading lower court case on the old combination doctrine.
In McNeil, the applicant appealed from a refusal by the Commissioner of Patents to grant a patent on his application covering the combi46
nation of a newly-invented stitch-forming mechanism with a trimmer.
The court contented itself with quoting from the opinion of the Assistant
Commissioner, adding only a citation to its prior decision, Durham v.
Seymour. 47 The opinion states, "i]t is old in a sewing-machine to combine a trimmer with a stitch-forming mechanism. This combination is
48
shown in the patent to Borton and Willcox."
The Assistant Commissioner opined that there was no invention in
bringing the stitch-forming mechanism together with the trimmer:
Borton and Willcox having invented the combination of a trimmer with
a stitch-forming mechanism, it is not invention to combine a trimmer
with another stitch-forming mechanism whether the stitch-forming
mechanism be new or old. No new result is accomplished by appellant
which differs in kind from the result accomplished by Borton and Willcox. There is no special coaction between the particular stitch-forming
mechanism and the trimmer. Each acts in its own way and is not affected by the other and performs its function in the combination irrewithin
spective of the other. I think that what the appellant has done is 49
the province of the mechanic and does not amount to invention.
It appears that the court added the citation to Durham to explain
why the Assistant Commissioner had stated that it was not invention to
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 231.
Id.
1902 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 563 (App. D.C. 1902).
Id. at 563-64.
Id. Durham v. Seymour, 1895 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 307 (App. D.C. 1895).
McNeil, 1902 Dec. Comm'r Pat. at 564.
Id. at 565.
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combine a trimmer with the applicant's stitch-forming mechanism even
if the latter was new. The court noted that the applicant had omitted to
claim the stitch-forming mechanism by itself stating, "[t]he particular
stitch-forming mechanism shown by appellant and which constitutes an
element in the combination of his claims is not separately claimed by the
appellant." 50 Durham held that subject matter not finally claimed before
the Examiner in the Patent Office is presumed to be abandoned, just as
much as if the patent had issued. 5 1
IV.

THE PATENTABILITY OF COMPUTER PROGRAM-RELATED
INVENTIONS

An important instance where the old combination doctrine should
have been applied, but was not, is the controversial Supreme Court case
of Parker v. Flook.52 In Flook, the applicant invented an improved
method for calculating an updated alarm value on a process variable, i.e.,
a mathematical algorithm. 53 However, instead of claiming the method
by itself, the applicant claimed it in combination with the steps of determining the present value of the process variable, and adjusting the
alarm limit to the updated alarm value (claim 1). 5 4 It was old to combine
the steps of determining the present value of a process variable, calculating an updated alarm value, and adjusting the alarm limit to the updated alarm value. 5 5 The omission to claim the improved method of
calculating the updated alarm value (the mathematical algorithm) by itself was an abandonment of it (so that it was "within the prior art"). It
was obvious ("it lacked patentable invention") to combine it with the
steps of determining the present value of the process variable and adjusting the alarm limit to the updated alarm value, where the actions of
these steps were not affected by the improvement of the updated alarm
value calculating step.
The presumption of abandonment could not have been rebutted.
The mathematical algorithm could not be claimed by itself because it did
not fall within one of the four statutory classes of patentable subject matter, i.e., "process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter" de50. Id. at 565.
51. 1895 Dec. Comm'r Pat. at 315 ("Having elected to amend again and again and finally to stand upon the three claims which were rejected, we think that the abandonment
of all else is as complete as if he had succeeded and received his patent thereon").
52. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
53. Id. at 585.
54. Id. at 596.
55. Id. at 585-86 ("The only difference between the conventional methods of changing
alarm limits and that described in respondent's application rests in the second step-the
mathematical algorithm or formula").
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fined by 35 U.S.C. section 101.56 In Gottschalk v. Benson,5 7 the Supreme
Court reasoned that a mathematical algorithm is like a law of nature,
and thus, applied the established rule that a law of nature cannot be the
subject of a patent.5 8 Thus, claim 1 could properly have been rejected in
Flook under the sections 102(c)/103 bar. However, the Court in Flook
instead held that claim 1 recited non-statutory subject matter and af9
firmed the rejection under, 35 U.S.C. section 101.5

Relying on its precedents MacKay Radio & Tel. v. Radio Corp. of
America 60 and Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co.,61 two pre-1952 Act cases,
the Court in Flook held, "[r]espondent's process is unpatentable under
§ 101 not because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior
art, the application considered as a whole contains no patentable invention."6 2 The Court's rejection was essentially the same as this author's
proposed rejection under the sections 102(c)/103 bar. Did the Court apply the sections 102(c)/103 bar under the guise of a section 101 rejection?
This is very likely.
In In re Bergy, 63 the majority concluded that the Supreme Court had
erroneously commingled "distinct statutory provisions which are conceptually unrelated."64 Apparently, the Patent Office Board of Appeals
agrees. In Ex parte Bonne, 65 the Board extended Flook to rejections
under section 103.66
A second instance where the old combination doctrine should have
been applied, but was not, is the Supreme Court case of Diamond v.
Diehr.6 7 In Diehr, the applicants invented an improved method for calculating cure time, i.e., a mathematical algorithm; but instead of claiming
it by itself, they claimed it in combination with the steps of pre-heating a
mold, putting unmolded rubber in the mold, closing the mold, initiating
an interval timer, heating the mold, comparing the calculated cure time
56. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
57. 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). Benson defined an "algorithm" as "a procedure for solving a
given type of mathematical problem." Id. at 65.
58. Id. at 67-68.
59. 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978).
60. 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
61. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
62. 437 U.S. at 594.
63. 596 F.2d 952, 201 U.S.P.Q. 352 (C.C.P.A. 1979), cert. granted, Diamond v. Bergy,
444 U.S. 924, 204 U.S.P.Q. 608 (C.C.P.A. 1979), and affd, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303 (1980), 206 U.S.P.Q. 193 (1980).
64. Id. at 959, 360.
65. P.T.O. Serial No. 885,070 (P.T.O.B.A. December 28, 1981) (unpublished opinion).
66. See Note, Jeffrey A. Simenauer, Patentability of Computer-Related Inventions: A
Criticism of the PTO's View on Algorithms, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 871 (1986).
67. 450 U.S. 175 (1985).
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with the elapsed time, opening the mold and removing the molded rubber (claim 11).68 It was old to combine the steps of pre-heating a mold,
putting unmolded-rubber in the mold, closing the mold, initiating an interval timer, heating the mold, calculating cure time, comparing the calculated cure time with the elapsed time, opening the mold and removing
the molded rubber. 69 The omission to claim the improved method for
calculating cure time by itself was an abandonment of it, and it was obvious to combine it with the steps of pre-heating a mold, putting unmolded
rubber in the mold, closing the mold, initiating an interval timer, heating the mold, comparing the calculated cure time with the elapsed time,
opening the mold and removing the molded rubber, where the actions of
these steps were not affected by the improvement of the cure time calculating step.
The presumption of abandonment could not have been rebutted.
The mathematical algorithm could not be claimed by itself because it
was non-statutory subject matter. Thus, claim 11 could properly have
been rejected under the sections 102(c)/103 bar. Instead, the Court in
Diehr held that claim 11 recited statutory subject matter and reversed
the rejection under 35 U.S.C. section 101.70 The Court distinguished
Flook, observing that Flook's claims set forth a method for computing an
alarm limit, which was simply a number, whereas the applicants in
Diehr were interested in protecting their rubber-molding process, a pro71
cess that the patent laws were designed to protect.
In a footnote, the dissent disagreed. 7 2 The dissent noted that the
only distinction between the invention in Flook and the one in Diehrwas
not in the characteristics of the inventions themselves, but in the drafting of the claims. 73 Furthermore, the dissent noted that the Diehr
claims can be redrafted into the format employed in the Flook application.74 This suggests that in Flook, the sections 102(c)/103 bar was ap68. Id. at 180 n. 5.
69. Id. at 208. (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("[fMinally, the Board of Patent Appeals expressly found that 'the only difference between the conventional methods of operating a
molding press and that claimed in [the] application rests in those steps of the claims which

relate to the calculation incident to the solution of the mathematical problem or formula
used to control the mold heater and the automatic opening of the press.' This finding was
not disturbed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and is clearly correct.") See
Robert A. Kreiss, The Theory of Overclaiming and its Application to Diamond v. Diehr, 66
J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'y 52 (1984).

70. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191.
71. Id. at 186-87.
72. Id. at 210, n. 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
.74. David A. Blumenthal & Bruce D. Riter, Statutory or Non-Statutory?:An Analysis of
the Patentability of Computer Related Inventions, 62 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y

454, 505 (1980).
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plied, whereas in Diehr it was not. This is the only significant difference
between the two cases.
V. CONCLUSION
There are two lines of Supreme Court authority for the view that 35
U.S.C. section 103 includes the bar of 35 U.S.C. section 102(c), at least
when the applicant omits to claim disclosed subject matter. First, Lincoln Engineering and its precedents suggest that the old combination
doctrine is based on section 103, and that the improved element is "prior
art" by virtue of its abandonment through failure to claim it by itself.
Second, Flook and its precedents appear to have determined patentability based on section 103 with the assumption that the non-statutory element is "prior art." Since the non-statutory element cannot be claimed
by itself, this suggests it is "prior art" by virtue of its abandonment.
This article has argued that the only significant difference between
the invention in Flook and that in Diehr was that in Flook, the sections
102(c)/103 bar was applied, whereas in Diehr it was not. This would explain the peculiar fact that the Diehr claims which were held to recite
statutory subject matter can be redrafted into the non-statutory format
employed in the Flook application.
The Patent Office is currently using the following test in deciding
whether to issue a patent on a computer-related invention which is useful: the first step is to determine whether the claim recites a mathematical algorithm. If the answer to the threshold question is "yes," proceed to
the second step. In the second step, ask whether the claim as a whole
merely recites a mathematical algorithm. If the answer is "yes," the
claim is not patentable under section 101. The first two steps are known
as the Freeman-Walter two-step test, named after the CCPA cases in
which it is found. 75 If the answer is "no" to the question asked in the
second step, proceed to the third step. In the third step, determine
whether the mathematical algorithm is within the prior art, and ask
whether the claim is new and non-obvious over the prior art. If the answer is "no," the claim is not patentable under sections 102 and 103.76
The foregoing analysis suggests that this test is inconsistent with
the standard actually applied by the Supreme Court in the BensonFlook-Diehrtrilogy. The test which the Patent Office should apply is the
following: the first step of the new test is to ascertain whether the claim
as a whole is for a mathematical algorithm, or contains a mathematical
75. In re Iwahashi, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
76. It should be noted that the recent cases of In re Alappat, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (Fed.
Cir. 1994), and In re Warmerdam, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1754 (Fed. Cir. 1994) only reached the
issue of whether a claim covering a computer program-related invention is allowable under
35 U.S.C. § 101, and not under §§ 102 and 103.
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algorithm as one of its components. If the answer to the threshold question is "yes" and the claim as a whole is for a mathematical algorithm,
the claim is not patentable under section 101. If the answer to the
threshold question is "yes" and the claim contains a mathematical algorithm as one of its components, proceed to the second step. In the second step, assume the algorithm is within the prior art (even if it is not),
and ask whether the claim is new and non-obvious over the prior art. If
the answer is "no," the claim is not patentable under sections 102 and
103.
Since this test assumes that the algorithm is within the prior art,
adopting it would simplify patentability determinations for the Patent
Office and silence its critics. Further, it would no longer be necessary to
determine whether the mathematical algorithm is actually within the
prior art.

